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di¶erence between old and new approaches to X.) The work—full of allusions and
intertexts—can be read for ediµcation (in popular-philosophical mode), entertainment
(an amusing, historically valid realization of symposium-culture) and Socratic
apologia. The last-named is achieved partly by creating a ‘Golden Age’ in which, for
example, Charmides (one of the Thirty—who killed Niceratus and Autolycus) is
charming, Lycon (Socrates’ accuser) calls him a real kaloskagathos, and the
Callias–Autolycus relationship (sordid to contemporary comedians) is uplifting (cf.
Ischomachus’ wife in Oeconomicus)—the imputation being that people deteriorated
when not under Socrates’ in·uence.
This is largely persuasive, and I end with some stray observations. 1.1 If X. is the
only Socratic to make himself or his I-narrator a direct authority and if 1.1 contradicts
the historical X’.s age, is X. making a joke about other Socratic writers’ pseudo-
historicity? 1.4 Callias deprecates generals—but is incited to political service at 8.37–8.
This deserves notice, as does the link of τποφδ0σγαιΚ with τποφδ//παιδι0 and Callias’
claim to be τποφδΚ 4ωιοξ (1.6). 1.11 H. thinks Philippus only pretends to be uninvited
(this is the joke in 1.12). If so, his suggestion that πα:δα is Philippus’ stomach loses
force; that Philippus has a slave is only inconsistent with his pretend-rôle (and
mentioning him is part of the joke). 4.23 That Critobulus is younger than Cleinias
adds another twist to the disconcerting way he rehearses his reactions to Cleinias
rather than others’ reactions to him. 4.27 Against a simple association of grammatistes
and elementary education see T. Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and
Roman World (Cambridge, 1998), 10¶., esp. 12 n. 31. 6–7 We move from silence (6) to
uproar (7.1) and a song (unenvisaged in 6.3–4). 6.10 (5ξ 7 νB δε: µ)ηειξ! %ζθ!
τιψπXΚ) is aimed at the Syracusan, and Socrates’ rejection of the entertainment value
of scientiµc problems about light (7.4) is prompted by his comments in 6.6–7 (cf.
Socrates’ remarks in 6.7 on divine provision of light and reference to the phrontistes tag
in 7.2). These connections are under-developed in H. 7.5 H. says the Syracusan
exercises artistic freedom in providing the Dionysus–Ariadne scenario. Is he not also
getting his own back? Socrates wants something tame and civilized, not excessive
gyrations. What the impresario produces provokes the physical sexual feelings which 8
denounces. (Whether this contextualizes or undermines Socrates’ message in 8 is
another matter.)
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The new Budé Categories has a vast introduction, a text with double apparatus and
facing translation, miscellaneous notes, three appendixes, and a thematic index.
In the introduction Bodeus urges that Cat. is not a lacunose treatment of the
‘categories’; ‘for nothing authorizes us to believe that the original text of our treatise
contained accounts of any category whatever after the study of quality’ (p. 141 n. 1).
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Rather, it is an introduction to certain dialectical issues; as such, it exhibits a ‘perfect
unity’ (p. XLII n. 2), and its rightful title is Πσ υξ υ.πψξ.
11b1–8 suggests that Cat. originally said something about at least one of the
‘missing’ categories. True, Minio-Paluello wanted the lines transposed to follow 11a14,
and that is where B. prints them. (If P.Oxy. 2403 shows that the MS order goes back to
the third century .., that merely proves that the displacement is ancient, p. 284
n. 117; cf. pp. CXL, 140 n. l.) But the transposition is anything but mandatory. As for
the title, Andronicus called the work Λαυθηοσαι; but no text implies that he invented
the name (pace pp. XXV, XXVI, XXXIII). Porphyry reports that some had called the
work Πσ υξ υοπιλξ (in Cat. 56.18–31), and a text deriving from Porphyry shows
that this title was known to Andronicus (Boethius, in Cat. 263BC). But nothing
suggests that it was the standard title before Andronicus. According to Simplicius,
Andronicus referred to ‘someone who entitled the book Πσ υξ υ.πψξ’ (in Cat.
379.8–10). But Simplicius’ story is garbled (so B., p. XXVI n. 2—and it would be easy
to correct υοπξ to υοπιλξ). Ammonius, in Cat. 14.20, Olympiodorus, in Cat. 22.34,
134.2, 7, Elias, in Cat. 132.26, 133.3, 241.30, and Arethas, in Cat. 136.12–13 all report
the title Πσ υξ υ.πψξ; but each of these texts is patently confused (see p. XXXIV
n. 4). The title Πσ υξ υ.πψξ appears in two of the catalogues of Aristotle’s works
(DL V 24; [Hesychius], vit. Arist. [no. 57]). But there is no reason to identify this with
Cat. (pace pp. XXXIII–XXXIV, LXXII): Alexander knew Πσ υξ υ.πψξ as a name
for Top. A (in Top. 5.27–8—B.’s attempt to interpret the text in another way is
unpersuasive). There is no case for holding that Πσ υξ υ.πψξ was an early title for
Cat., let alone the author’s title.
B. has collated the µfty MSS of Cat. which are earlier than the fourteenth century
(p. IX). He divides them into µve families, it being impossible to establish a stemma
(p. CLXXIII). Whereas M.-P. adduces only two MSS, B. uses eleven, which he calls
‘the principal witnesses’ (p. CXII). It is irritating that his full account of all this is
published elsewhere (p. CXIL n. 1).
In addition to the medieval MSS—and three scraps of papyrus—there is the
evidence of the Greek commentaries and of the early translations. B. is more generous
than M.-P. in his references to this indirect tradition, but he has a low estimate of its
value. (See pp. CLI–CLII; cf. pp. CLXXV, CLXXXII.) He is right to insist that it is
often di¸cult to ascertain exactly what text the tradition supposes (e.g. p. CLVI). But
he is wrong when he asserts that, given µve independent families of MSS, then ‘rich
though it is, the indirect tradition is only useful for the establishment of the text in very
rare cases—and even then its utility consists, without exception, in supporting a known
reading which looks authentic in its own right’ (p. CLXXVI). M.-P. thought the
indirect tradition to be independent of α, the archetype of the medieval MSS; hence a
reading o¶ered by Porphyry or Boethius is equal in weight, ceteris paribus, to all the
readings in all the MSS, however many families they constitute. B. agrees that the
indirect tradition is independent of α (see pp. CLIII, 254, 277; cf. p. CLXVI). He ought
therefore to share M.-P.’s evaluation, and in practice, he does. B.’s Cat. di¶ers from
M.-P.’s in more than 170 places. He claims that this is ‘the e¶ect of the attention which
we have given to a far richer MS tradition’ (p. CLXXXIV). But in only four places does
B. prefer a MS reading and M.-P. the indirect tradition, and on more than a dozen
occasions B. gives more weight to the indirect tradition than does M.-P.
Almost all of B.’s di¶erences from M.-P. are tri·ing, in that they do not make any
di¶erence to the sense (cf. p. CLXXXIII); but the tri·es are collectively signiµcant. B.
believes that Cat. is a ‘scholastic’ text (cf. p. CLXXXV); and so, on principle, he prefers
readings which produce repetition or redundancy. If his principle is accepted, then in
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at least 125 places  he is right against M.-P.—and the result is a Cat. distinctly
un-Aristotelian in style. But then B. suspects that Cat. was not written by Aristotle
(pp. CVII–CX). Should we embrace B.’s principle? He supposes it more likely that
copyists would drop redundancies and repetitions than that they would introduce
them. Given the history of Cat., the latter seems as likely as the former.
Not all of B.’s major disagreements with M.-P. command assent. At 1a2, 4, 7, and
10 he deletes υΚ οupsilonlenisταΚ (after Waitz), claiming to follow the text of Andronicus and
Boethus (p. 253 n. 1). According to Porphyry, Boethus did not comment on the phrase,
and neither he nor Andronicus paraphrased it: Porphyry infers that it was missing
from their MSS (Simplicius, in Cat. 29.29–30.5). The inference is frail—the more so
inasmuch as Porphyry himself insists that it makes no odds whether you say O λαυ1
υοupsilonlenisacuteξονα µ.ηοΚ υΚ οupsilonlenisταΚ or simply O µ.ηοΚ (in Cat. 68.15–18). I doubt if the phrase
was missing from any ancient MSS. B. transposes 2b5–6b to follow 2a35, claiming the
authority of Porphyry (pp. 256–7 n. 15). The lines are redundant, or worse: I cannot
see that Porphyry, in Cat. 89.16–17, supports their transposition, and Simplicius was
right to delete them (in Cat. 88.24–9). At 2b11 B. adds δεupsilonacuteυεσαι, again claiming to
follow Porphyry (pp. 257–8 n. 19): the word appears at in Cat. 92.15–16—but in an
expansive paraphrase. M.-P., following Cook Wilson, cut 11b8–17. B. agrees, save that
he keeps 11b15–16: ‘Enough has been said about the kinds which were proposed [υξ
πσουερ)ξυψξ ηεξξ]’. He  thinks  that the kinds  are ‘the (four) genera which he
proposed to examine at 2a11 to 11a38’ (p. 142 n. 2, p. 286 n. 124). But Cat. has never
proposed to examine four kinds, and the author of 11b15–16 is patently thinking of
1b27–8. At 15a16–17, where M.-P. obelizes, B. prints <οupsilonlenisδG Z> νεψτιΚ, which he
describes as a ‘palmary conjecture’ (p. 300 n. 171). It is not bad. But I should prefer, for
example, αupsilonlenisacuteωθτιΚ [ for Z αupsilonlenisacuteωθτιΚ.
Under the text there are two apparatuses. The upper one lists testimonies. The list
does not purport to be complete (e.g. it omits the citations in Didymus: CPF I 1*,
pp. 289–92). Moreover, the numerous citations in the CIAG commentaries on Cat. are
given separately in Appendix I. The disadvantages of this are evident, the advantages
less so. The lower apparatus, an apparatus criticus, purportedly contains ‘only the
variants which are most important for the understanding of   the text itself ’
(p. CLXXXI). But B. has a comprehensive idea of what is important. Moreover, the
apparatus is positive, and it does not use the family names of the MSS. The result is
thick, forbidding, and di¸cult to consult. Since all the material—and a little more—is
repeated in Appendix II, B. would have gained much and lost nothing had he placed a
more streamlined apparatus beneath the text. He might then have found room for a few
conjectures (e.g. at 1b23–24, or 14a26).
The translation is close—it aspires to the sort of µdelity characteristic of the
Clarendon Aristotle series. In particular, B. has decided to translate most of the Greek
particles: this makes for heavy—and sometimes misleading—French. Technical terms
are usually given their orthodox translations; but ‘imputer’ etc. for λαυθηοσε:ξ etc.
(1b10 et semper) is eccentric. ποτ.ξ and ποι.ξ are generally ‘quantité’ and ‘qualité’ (see
p. 48 n. 1): this is particularly unfortunate at 3b10 and 20. There is a slip at 8a32–3,
where 5ξ >θρεθ υι πσΚ αupsilonlenisυ0 must mean ‘something might be said against the point’.
As for the notes, most of them are useful, and some of them are excellent. (But
Aristotle does not hold that no individuals have proper names: Met. 1035b2–3 refers to
individual circles, not to individuals in general.) If their corporate function is unclear,
and if their division into footnotes and endnotes—a division based on no exegetical
principle and answering to no typographical exigency—is inexcusably exasperating,
then B. should not be held responsible for the foibles of Budé.
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B.’s edition represents a vast labour and presents a vast number of facts. It does not
replace M.-P.’s OCT; but it may stand alongside that remarkable text.
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D[icaearchus] did not share the encyclopaedic interests of his master, Aristotle; but
his philosophical voice is more distinctive than that of some of Aristotle’s followers,
and adds variety and depth to our picture of the early Lyceum. The present volume
(which follows the editors’ Demetrius of Phalerum in the same series) supersedes
Wehrli’s 1944 collection of D.’s fragments by presenting an improved edition of the
sources, and a series of ten discursive essays by a distinguished international team of
scholars. The edition is by M[irhady]: it starts with a list of book-titles attested for D.,
provides more contextual material than Wehrli, and adds three substantial new
sources. There is a facing English translation (which just occasionally veers into
solecism, but is generally elegant and accurate). M.’s ‘fundamental criterion of
inclusion’ is strict: that D. is named in the text (normally, at least; as it happens this is
not true of any of the three ‘new’ fragments). But the great virtue of the volume’s
arrangement is that more speculative attributions can be covered as well in the
essays—where there is more room to discuss their claims.
D. is best known for his contributions to psychology and historical anthropology,
and both topics receive multiple treatment in this volume. Sharples and Caston try, in
a paper each, to pin down D.’s psychological position, and to square what is certain,
that D. denied that the soul was substantially distinct from the body, with trickier
evidence that he explained certain forms of divination by the activity of the soul
outside the body (Source 31A, from Cicero). Sharples inclines towards an emergent
view of the Dicaearchan soul according to which it is not independent of the body, but
does have causal e¸cacy over it. His caution in approaching the evidence is well taken;
though I am attracted to Caston’s argument in favour of a ‘bold’ epiphenomenalism,
a soul which is perfectly reliant on the body and is causally ine¸cacious. Caston relies
for a solution of the apparent contradiction in the claim that the soul could operate
outside the body on a nice point (that the crucial claim in the crucial source comes in
the mouth of an interlocutor); Sharples, on the other hand, reaches the pessimistic
conclusion that insolubility is built into the poor quality of the evidence possessed, and
supplied, by Cicero.
D.’s Life of Greece and the history of civilization it presents is the subject of
discussions by Saunders, Schütrumpf, and Ax. (Ax is interested in the work’s in·uence
on Varro, but also has careful and extremely useful discussions of matters such as its
title, genre, and theme.) The traditional view of the work has D. argue for the decline
of mankind from a ‘golden age’, but Saunders and Ax both challenge this view,
and reconstruct for D. a theory which both describe with a phrase borrowed from
from Bernhard Reischl: ‘ambivalente Aszendenztheorie’. It is true, they say, that
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